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Abstract: Previous studies have found that subordinated debt (sub-debt) markets do 
differentiate between banks with different risk profiles.  This finding satisfies a 
necessary condition for regulatory proposals which would mandate increased reliance 
on sub-debt in the bank capital structure to discipline banks’ risk taking.  Such 
proposals, however, have not been implemented, partially because there are still 
concerns about the quality of the signal generated in current debt markets. We argue 
that previous studies evaluating the potential usefulness of sub-debt proposals have 
evaluated spreads in an environment that is very different from the one that will 
characterize a fully implemented sub-debt program. With a fully implemented program, 
the market will become deeper, issuance will be more frequent, debt will be viewed as a 
more viable means to raise capital, bond dealers will be less reluctant to publicly 
disclose more details on debt transactions, and generally, the market will be more 
closely followed.  As a test to see how the quality of the signal may change, we evaluate 
the risk-spread relationship, accounting for the enhanced market transparency 
surrounding new debt issues. Our empirical results indicate a superior risk-spread 
relationship surrounding the period of new debt issuance due, we posit, to greater 
liquidity and transparency.  Our results overall suggest that the degree of market 
discipline would likely be enhanced by a mandatory sub-debt program requiring banks 
to regularly approach the market to issue sub-debt. 
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The Potential Role of Subordinated Debt Programs  
In Enhancing Market Discipline in Banking 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 T 
“There is now general agreement that the markets are increasingly 
complex – making it more difficult for supervisors and regulators – and that 
(bank) supervision and regulation have significant costs and inefficiencies. As 
a result, we must begin to increase our reliance on market discipline both as a 
governor and as an indicator …. Sub-debt holders would therefore be 
expected to impose market discipline on the bank that is quite consistent with 
what bank supervisors are trying to do…”  [Meyer (1998)] 
 
There is a growing awareness that increased reliance on market forces by bank supervisors 
is necessary given the increasing level of complexity in the industry; particularly at the large complex 
banking organizations (LCBOs).
1   In fact, the new Basel Capital Accord (Basel II) proposes that 
market discipline be one of the three pillars supporting safety and soundness of the banking system. 
 One recommended means of establishing more effective market discipline in banking would be to 
introduce a mandatory sub-debt component as part of the bank capital requirement.  The basic 
contention is that mandating sub-debt issuance would force the bank to continually “pass the test of 
the market” and would provide signals to market participants of the condition of the bank.  A sub-
debt requirement could serve to produce both direct market discipline by increasing the funding 
costs for the bank, and indirect discipline by having bank supervisors respond to the signal from sub-
debt spreads.
2  This has led to a number of reform proposals to formally introduce mandatory sub-
debt requirements for LCBOs, since it is these institutions that are typically associated with systemic 
concerns of regulators.
3  
Previous research found that sub-debt spreads do indeed reflect an issuing bank’s 
                                                 
1  See Greenspan (2000), Ferguson (1999), Meyer (1999, 2000), Moskow (1998), and Bank for International 
Settlement (1999). 
2  To avoid the increased funding costs and adverse market signal, banks would operate in their own self- 
interest and prudently manage their risk.  For discussion on the potential benefits associated with 
mandatory sub-debt programs, see Kwast, et al. (1999) and Evanoff and Wall (2000a,b).  
3  See Benink and Schmidt (2000), Calomiris (1997, 1998), Evanoff and Wall (2000a, b) and U.S. Shadow 
Regulatory Committee (2000).  
                                                
financial condition [see Flannery and Sorescu (1996), DeYoung, Flannery, Lang and Sorescu 
(2001), Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux (2002), Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001), Allen, Jagtiani and 
Moser (2001), and Morgan and Stiroh (2000 and 2001)], satisfying a precondition for sub-debt 
proposals to be effective.  In addition, Evanoff and Wall (2001, 2002) suggest that sub-debt 
spreads may be more informative for identifying problem banks than are the current regulatory 
measures used to trigger ‘prompt corrective action’ by U.S. bank supervisors. Yet, a mandatory 
sub-debt program has not been implemented by bank regulators as there continues to be 
concerns about using the signal extracted from debt yields to monitor or predict the viability of 
banking institutions due to the current lack of market depth, trading frequency, heterogeneous 
debt characteristics, and infrequency of issuance.
4   
 We contend that previous studies evaluating the potential usefulness of sub-debt 
programs are likely to have underestimated the potential impact of these programs.  This occurs 
because the environment in which yields have been evaluated will most likely be very different 
from the environment characterized by a fully implemented, mandatory sub-debt program.  A 
formal sub-debt program can be expected to induce a number of adjustments in financial 
markets. Specifically, debt markets will likely become deeper, issuance will become more 
frequent,
5 debt will be viewed as a more viable means to raise regulatory capital, more attention 
will be paid to individual bank debt yields, bond dealers will be encouraged by pressure from both 
the banks and the public to be less reluctant to publicly disclose actual debt transaction prices, 
and generally, markets will be more closely followed.  With a mandatory sub-debt program in 
place, the market will most likely become more complete, making the resulting market signals 
more informative.
  Therefore, previous studies of the risk-spread relationship are likely to have 
underestimated the potential impact of sub-debt proposals, and concerns about the quality of the 
signal from these markets as a result of thin markets, heterogeneous debt instruments, etc., may 
 
4    See Board of Governors (2000), Bliss (2001), Bliss and Flannery (2001), Birchler and Hancock (2004), 
Hancock and Kwast (2001).   
5  Mandatory periodic issuance, e.g., twice a year, is typically one component of a comprehensive sub-debt 
proposal. Empirical evidence has suggested that riskier banks purposely avoid approaching the market with 
new sub-debt issues; one argument is they do this to avoid the resulting discipline of the market.   
be mitigated in an environment with a fully implemented program.  This difference between the 
current and potential future market is partially a result of the well known Lucas Critique in which 
firms respond to regulatory change and optimize within the new regulatory framework, with 
constraints that may be very different than those that existed before the change.  
 
We take into consideration potential changes in the market environment brought about by 
a mandatory sub-debt program to improve the risk-spread relationship and the potential extent of 
market discipline by focusing on the performance of sub-debt markets at times when they 
probably most closely approximate the new proposed environment—the period surrounding new 
debt issues.  Specifically, we postulate that current markets are “deeper,” more transparent, and 
informative around initial placements, resulting in significantly different risk pricing behavior.  We 
find empirical evidence consistent with this contention.  Our prior is that after a sub-debt proposal 
has been fully implemented, the characteristics of sub-debt markets will be somewhat similar to 
what we find in today’s markets around initial debt issues.  Therefore, the actual market discipline 
imposed will likely be greater than that suggested in previous studies.
   Although our use of the 
new debt issuance period probably more closely approximates that which would exist with a 
mandatory sub-debt program, with a fully implemented program, debt markets will most likely 
become even deeper and more fluid than that seen around new issues in today’s markets.  Thus 
our analysis should be considered an improvement, but a lower bound measure of the potential 
increase in market discipline following the introduction of a mandatory sub-debt policy. 
  
The paper proceeds as follows.  We present the literature review in Section II.  In Section 
III, we introduce our empirical approach for evaluating the extent to which sub-debt yields reflect 
bank risks and how the risk-spread relationship may differ in an environment with a mandatory 
sub-debt program.   Our data and the empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 
IV. Finally, Section V summarizes and evaluates the policy implications of the analysis. 
 
II.  Literature Review 
One proposed means of establishing more effective market discipline in banking would be to  
                                                
introduce a mandatory sub-debt component as part of the bank capital requirement.  The basic 
contention is that mandating sub-debt issuance would force banks to continually “pass the test of the 
market” and would provide signals to market participants of the condition of the bank.  To avoid the 
increased funding costs and adverse market signal, banks would operate in their own self- interest 
and prudently manage their risk.  A sub-debt requirement could serve to produce both direct market 
discipline by increasing the funding costs for the bank, and indirect discipline by having bank 
supervisors respond to the signal from sub-debt spreads.
6   
These arguments have led to a number of reform proposals to formally introduce mandatory 
sub-debt requirements for LCBOs, since it is these institutions that are typically associated with 
systemic concerns by regulators [Benink and Schmidt (2000), Calomiris (1997, 1998), Evanoff and 
Wall (2000a, b) and U.S. Shadow Regulatory Committee (2000)]. For these proposals to have merit, 
holders of bank-issued sub-debt need to effectively price the riskiness of the bank into the required 
yields in a manner consistent with financial theory.  This has been the focus of a number of recent 
studies, discussed below, which evaluate the relationship between sub-debt spreads and the risk 
characteristics of the issuing bank to determine whether debt holders demand a higher yield 
commensurate with the risk profile of banks.  
 
Sub-Debt Spreads and Direct Market Discipline  
It has been well documented in the literature that the market accounts for risk when 
pricing sub-debt of banking organizations.  In addition, more recent research finds that bank 
managerial decisions appear to be influenced by the market’s pricing of debt.  When sub-debt 
spread was not found to be related to risk measures, there is evidence indicating that debt 
holders were not at risk in spite of the riskiness of the issuing bank -- partially due to the 
 
7 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) attempted to address the TBTF 
issue and eliminate the perception that debt holders were not at risk by requiring prompt corrective action by 
regulators and least cost resolution provisions. These provisions imposed a relatively stringent process on 
the FDIC before it could extend protection in a failed-bank resolution beyond insured deposits—the 
systemic risk exemption. There are still some evidence, however, that a perceived TBTF policy may still be 
in effect even after the FDICIA -- see Kane (2000), Penas and Unal (2004), and Brewer and Jagtiani 
(2007)].   
government's conjectural guarantee.  The guarantee was decreased in the U.S. via policy and 
legislative changes in the early 1990s, and debt holders (the markets) apparently responded by 
more accurately pricing risk, as debt holders no longer perceived themselves to be protected 
from losses.   
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) examined secondary market prices and yields of sub-debt 
issued by bank holding companies (BHCs) during the 1983 to 1991 period.  They found evidence 
of risk being priced in the more recent sub-period (1989-1991) when debt holders were thought to 
be subject to losses, but not during the earlier sub-periods (1983-1985 and 1986-1988). They 
argued that in the earlier sub-periods, there was a general perception that certain banks were 
too-big-to-fail (TBTF).  That is, there was a conjectural guarantee for all liability holders at LCBOs 
during this period.  Thus, yields were not risk sensitive because debt holders did not perceive 
themselves to be at risk.
7
Jagtiani, Kaufman, and Lemieux (2002) added to the literature by extending the analysis 
into the post-FDICIA period and separately evaluated publicly traded sub-debt issued by BHCs 
and sub-debt issued directly by banks.  Analysis of bank-issued sub-debt is important because 
most of the reform proposals recommend the debt be issued at the bank level instead of the BHC 
level (see Evanoff and Wall, 2002).  They found that the market did account for risk differences 
and priced risks for both types of sub-debt, although BHC-issued sub-debt yielded a higher risk 
premium. This differential could reflect the lower priority on the BHC’s assets in case of 
insolvency and/or, as argued by others, it could be a result of the safety net being directed at the 
bank instead of the BHC. 
 The important finding is that under a number of alternative 
specifications the market did appear to impose risk premia on sub-debt issued at the bank level.  
Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001) examined sub-debt spreads of failed banks during the period 
prior to their failure and found evidence of strong market discipline.  BHC-issued sub-debt 
spreads significantly rose as early as six quarters prior to the failure of the bank subsidiary.  They 
concluded that sub-debt spreads could potentially be a useful signal in the supervisory process. 
This aligns well with proposals to consider debt spreads for initiating prompt correction action by  
supervisors. 
Morgan and Stiroh (2000) analyzed whether or not the market was “tough enough” in 
pricing BHC risk.  They evaluated primary issues and tested whether debt spreads reflected the 
risk of a BHC’s portfolio.  They also performed a similar analysis for non-banks to evaluate 
whether the risk-spread relationship differed between the banking organization and non-banks 
and whether the market adequately disciplined larger banking organizations.  Their concern was 
that TBTF policies may still result in the market being “too easy” on larger institutions like the 
LCBOs.  They found that the market did price risk exposure at banking organizations -- that is, as 
their portfolio is shifted into riskier activities, they are forced to pay higher spreads. The risk-
spread relationship was nearly identical across the bank and non-bank sectors. However, the 
risk-spread relationship was weaker for larger banking organizations. They interpret this as 
evidence that larger banking organizations still benefit from implicit guarantees, although there 
may be alternative interpretations. 
Covitz, Hancock, and Kwast (2000) modeled and empirically estimated the bond issuance 
decision of banking organizations, and found evidence consistent with the market exerting 
discipline on the debt issuance decision.  That is, riskier banks have a higher probability of not 
issuing new debt: a finding consistent with ex ante discipline by debt markets and stressing the 
need for a mandatory program instead of a voluntary one. They also found the market to be less 
vigilant during more tranquil periods.  They concluded that market discipline could be enhanced 
by a mandatory sub-debt requirement and that bank supervisors could benefit from monitoring 
sub-debt spreads.   
Finally, Bliss and Flannery (2001) questioned whether the debt markets were able to 
influence the behavior of bank managers. While they found sub-debt spreads were associated 
with the riskiness of the bank, they did not find evidence consistent with “managerial influence.” 
That is, management was not found, ex post, to respond with portfolio shifts in an attempt to 
decrease the risk of the firm after debt holders ‘informed’ them that they had become concerned  
                                                
with their risk profile by requiring larger debt spreads.
8   Thus, they questioned whether discipline 
was being imposed if no signs of influence were found.  However, Ashcraft (2006) found that a 
larger share of subordinated debt in regulatory capital had a positive impact on the future viability 
of distressed banks in the post-FDICIA period when the ability of the FDIC to absorb the losses of 
sub-debt holders was significantly restricted. This is consistent with the finding that debt holders 
reacted differently in the post-FDICIA period and imposed discipline on troubled banks.  
 
Sub-Debt Spreads and Indirect Market Discipline 
The potential usefulness of incorporating market information -- sub-debt spreads and 
changes in sub-debt spreads, equity prices, returns, and volatility; EDF estimated default 
probabilities, etc. -- into the bank supervisory process has also been documented in the 
literature.
9  The results overall suggest that market information could be used to improve the 
predictive accuracy of traditional off-site monitoring models in predicting the future condition of the 
bank, frequently measured by changes in the CAMEL ratings assigned by regulators.  This is not 
to imply that the market knows more about the condition of banks than do bank supervisors, who 
have access to extensive private information through their on-site examination process.  Rather, it 
is a realization that financial markets, and the supervision of those markets, are becoming 
increasingly complex and all possible sources of information should be utilized.   
Meyer (1998) argued that the spreads could be used to help the FDIC set more accurate 
deposit insurance premiums.  Evanoff and Wall (2001, 2002) suggest using sub-debt spreads to 
initiate prompt corrective action by bank supervisors.  Using the examiners’ overall rating of the 
banking organization (CAMELS or BOPEC) as the measure of the ‘true’ riskiness of the 
organization, they found that debt spreads did as well or better at predicting the riskiness of the 
 
8 See Evanoff and Wall (2000b) for a critique of the policy conclusions of Bliss and Flannery. For 
completeness, there has also been research evaluating the potential for market discipline from sub-debt and 
other market instruments in non-U.S. markets -- see Sironi (2001, 2003), Hamalainen, Howcroft and Hall 
(2003) and Baumann, and Nier (2003). 
9  See Seale and Bloecher (2001), Curry, Elmer and Fissel (2003), Krainer and Lopez (2004), Berger, 
Davies and Flannery (2000), Krishman, Richken and Thomson (2006), Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2006), 
and Gunther, Levonian and Moore (2001).  
banking organization than did capital ratios (the measure currently used to initiate prompt 
corrective action).  Hancock and Kwast (2001) find that monitoring of sub-debt markets by bank 
supervisors could provide useful information, although they questioned whether supervisory 
actions should be tied directly to this information – due to concerns related to the quality of the 
sub-debt signal and the potential inconsistency of data on sub-debt spreads across banks.   
With a realization that sub-debt spreads may be noisy, below we examine the important 
determinants of sub-debt spreads.  To account for illiquidity, transparency, and disclosure 
quality, we pay particular attention to those spreads around the period of new debt issues when 
the market tends to be deeper and more transparent as issuers tend to be more forthcoming in 
disclosing information.  More precisely, we examine differences in the pricing behavior of bank 
sub-debt during the issuance period relative to other periods and contend that the 
characteristics of the market surrounding new issues will more closely approximate those that 
would exist with a fully implemented sub-debt program.  
 
III.  The Empirical Model  
Our empirical approach relies on the assumption that banks may be less opaque around 
the time they approach the market for new debt placements.  This is likely to be a result of the 
initial placement process in which banks realize that the issue will be evaluated by credit rating 
agencies and their financial condition will receive more scrutiny than it typically would on a 
continual, on-going basis.  Thus, banks are likely to be more forthcoming and more willing to 
provide the market with additional information in order to convince it to accept their new debt 
issue and to favorably price/rate it [see Covitz and Harrison (2004)].  This is not to imply that the 
banks attempt to hide information at other times, rather that they simply have a process for new 
debt issues which generates more information for the markets. Unless some newsworthy event 
occurs, less information will typically be provided on an on-going basis to the secondary market.  
This should result in a more informative spread-risk relationship during the issuance period, due 
to the increased information flow.   To test for the presence of this differential effect, we take a somewhat ‘progressive’ 
approach in our analysis. We start with a basic model to describe the risk-spread relationship and 
progressively account for additional influences including the potential for sample selection bias, 
year fixed-effects and firm fixed-effects. We then utilize a specification that attempts to account 
for the marginal impact of risk around the time of new issues.  Since there is no obvious preferred 
model, we estimate a number of alternative specifications. Although initially adding elements to 
the basic model probably helps capture important influences on the spread relationship, moving 
to the most sophisticated model may stress the small sample characteristics of our data.  
Importantly, we will be looking for robustness across the various specifications, particularly with 
respect to the risk variables.      
            
The Basic Model of the Risk-Spread Relationship  
The first step is to specify a model that explains the bank’s sub-debt spread.   Spreads 
are expected to be related to macroeconomic conditions, characteristics of the issuing bank, and 
characteristics of the debt instrument.  That is:  
         ( 1 )   ) , , ( , , , t i t i i t i X R M f SPREAD =
where SPREADit  is the difference between the sub-debt yield for bank i and the yield of a 
Treasury security with the same time to maturity at the end of each quarter,  Mt is a vector of 
macroeconomic measures,  Rit is a vector of the various measures of bank i’s risk, and Xit is a 
vector of other firm-specific or security-specific control variables. 
Since credit spreads may vary over the business cycle, we capture the influence of 
general economic and financial market conditions with an array of financial variables. UNEMPt is 
the seasonally adjusted national unemployment rate obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Data, and TBILL_3Mt is the 3-month Treasury bill (secondary market) rate. We also include a 
binary variable to indicate the current state of economic conditions (D_EXPAND), which is equal 
to one if it is an expansionary period and zero otherwise.  This variable is obtained from the 
business cycle reference measure provided by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
  
                                                
(NBER).   
To account for risk differences across banks and through time, we include alternative 
measures of bank risk. Balance sheet risk variables include the percent of non-performing loans 
to total assets (NPLOAN), percent of other real estate owned to total assets (OREO), the return 
on assets (ROA), and the market leverage ratio (MKTLEV).  The variable MKTLEV is the ratio of 
total liabilities (book value) to the combined value of common stock (market value) and preferred 
stock (book value).  This is a proxy of the banking organization’s default risk as perceived by the 
market, since it captures the shift in market price of the bank’s common stock relative to the 
movement of the bank’s balance sheet information.
10  As an alternative to the balance sheet risk 
measures, we include an ‘agency’ measure of banking organization’s credit rating assigned by 
Standard & Poor’s (SPRATE).  The variable definitions are summarized in Table 1.  Table 2 
Panel A provides summary statistics of the variables.  The cardinalization of the S&P ratings 
follows the scale used in Ronn and Verma (1987) and Jagtiani, Kaufman, Lemieux (2002), as 
shown in Table 2 Panel B, where less creditworthy banks (lower alphabetical rating) are 
converted to a larger numerical rating. 
The risk variables NPLOAN, OREO, SPRATE, and MKTLEV are expected to be positively 
correlated with spread.  The role of ROA is somewhat ambiguous. Higher ROA could reflect 
market power and/or greater efficiency implying a negative expected relationship with SPREAD.  
However, it could also be indicative of greater risk taking implying a positive relationship.  We are 
particularly interested in whether individually or combined the risk measures affect the debt 
spread.  Collinearity between the alternative measures could mask somewhat the individual 
influence of the variables, so, we will also evaluate the influence of the group of risk measures on 
sub-debt spreads.   
In addition to the risk and macroeconomic variables, we include a number of control 
 
10  This definition of leverage takes into account the market value of the bank rather than relying purely on 
book-value accounting information.  This definition has been used in Jagtiani, Kaufman, and Lemieux 
(2002), Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001), Flannery and Sorescu (1996), and Hancock and Kwast (2001).  This 
measure tends to be positively related to the bank’s sub-debt spreads, reflecting greater risk at banks with 
higher market leverage ratios. variables describing characteristics of the issuing bank and the debt instrument.  To allow 
differences resulting from bank size, we include ASSETS, which is measured as the log of bank 
assets, to control for size.  The coefficients of ASSETS are expected to be negative as larger 
banking organizations are likely to be more diversified and better managed, and some may also 
be perceived by the market as being “too-big-to-fail”.  To account for where within the banking 
organization the debt is issued, the variable D_BANK is set equal to one if the observed spreads 
are associated with sub-debt issued at the bank level, and zero if the sub-debt was issued at the 
BHC level.  Sub-debt spreads may be somewhat narrower when issued at the bank level due to 
either the bank being a less risky entity than the parent organization or the fact that the FDIC 
federal guarantee is provided at the bank level.
  We also account for the bond’s term to maturity 
since past research has found differences in spreads over the life of the bond.  Huang and Huang 
(2003) find that less than 25 percent of the credit risk-spread is explained by credit risk and that 
behavior of the credit spreads (which have already accounted for time to maturity along the yield 
curve) differ at short maturities from that of long maturities.  We use a binary variables TTM_Long 
to indicate that the bond has a maturity of five years or longer.
11   
The basic SPREAD specification is:     
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  We divide our observations into two subsamples based on whether the banking organization 
has recently issued new debt – issuance subsample and non-issuance subsample – and estimate 
the basic risk-spread model based on equation (2) separately for each of the subsamples.  We then 
compare the estimated coefficients between the two subsamples to evaluate the importance of risk 
variables in determining sub-debt spreads during the issuance vs. non-issuance period.   
                                                 
11   We also considered a continuous measure using the number of quarters until the maturity date. Our 
  
                                                                                                                                                               
  For each observation, a binary variable D_ISSUE is equal to one if the bank has issued 
new debt in the current or previous quarter, and equal to zero otherwise.  The issuance 
subsample consists of observations around new issues only, that is, D_ISSUE=1.  The non-
issuance subsample consists of observations whose D_ISSUE=0.  Since debt issuance may 
occur early or late in the quarter, resulting in varying amount of information being distributed to 
the market, we include the quarter immediately following the issuance quarter in our D_ISSUE 
definition as well to allow for the full distribution of information and transparency to take place.  All 
the relevant information should be in the public domain in the quarter following issuance 
regardless of when in the previous quarter the actual issuance occurred.   
  In order to test whether the risk-spread relationship is tighter (stronger market discipline) 
for the issuance subsample than for the non-issuance subsample, we perform the following 
analysis.  First, we test whether the marginal contribution of the risk variables to the overall 
measure of goodness-of-fit (R-square) is larger for the issuance subsample than for the non-
issuance subsample.  Closely-related to this, we test whether the significance and joint-
significance of the risk variables are stronger for the issuance subsample than for the non-
issuance subsample.  We recognize that comparing the adjusted R-square across different data 
sets needs to be undertaken with care.  Since the R-square is a measure of proportion of 
variation explained by independent variables relative to the total variation, the R-square is thus 
sensitive to the total variation of the dependent variable – see Kennedy (2003).  To the extent 
that the variation of SPREAD is different across the issuance and non-issuance subsamples, it is 
arguable that the comparison across these subsamples may be distorted in an unknown 
direction.  The summary statistics presented in Table 2, however, indicate that the variance of 
SPREAD is similar in magnitude across the two subsamples, suggesting that our comparison of 
R-square across issuance and non-issuance subsamples is not inappropriate.   
  Second, we utilize an alternative approach to compare goodness-of-fit across the 
issuance and non-issuance subsamples.  Specifically, we fit the various model specifications 
 
findings were less significant, but overall consistent across specifications.  
                                                
using the entire data set – both issuance and non-issuance observations imposing the same 
spread relationship across the sample. We then separately calculate the root mean square errors 
(RMSEs) for the two subsamples, We find that this measure of goodness-of-fit (using RMSEs and 
changes in RMSEs) behaves in similar fashion as the adjusted R-square.  We conclude that our 
comparison of the adjusted R-square across subsamples is a useful metric for our specific 
empirical exercise (although it could be inappropriate in other circumstances).  The adjusted R-
square and RMSEs are reported in the bottom of each table for each model specification. 
  Finally, we test whether sub-debt spreads respond differently to changes in the risk 
variables across the two subsamples – i.e. testing the difference in the coefficients of the risk 
variables between the issuance and non-issuance subsamples.  The difference in the risk pricing 
behavior between the two subsamples may arise from the improved disclosure accuracy and 
transparency during the period around new issuances.  However, regardless of cause, we are 
most interested in seeing if the response to risk differs across the two subsamples.
12  To put the 
magnitude of the differences into perspective, we also calculate the Risk-Spread Net Effect, 
which is a measure of change in SPREAD as the balance sheet risk variables change in the 
direction that increases the bank’s risk by one standard deviation.  The calculated Risk-Spread 
Net Effect measures are also reported in the bottom of each table, and they are expected to be 
larger for the issuance subsample to indicate stronger market discipline during the issuance 
period.   
 
Extended Models For Risk-spread Relationship: 
We then extend the basic risk-spread relationship model to take advantages of the panel 
structure of our data and to account for possible sample selection bias.  The results from our 
extended model are intended to provide a robustness test for our basic analysis.  The intention is 
not to proof that the extended model better represents the real data generating process than the 
 
12 While we initially casually compare the coefficient on the risk variables, below we will formally test 
whether or not the differences in coefficients of the risk variables are significant -- see the section called 
“Single Equation Estimation for the Marginal Effect Around Issuance.”    
benchmark model, but rather, to make sure that our basic results are robust to plausible 
extensions.   
We extend our benchmark risk-spread model in three ways.   First, we add year dummy 
variables to our basic model in order to better control for any differences in the financial markets 
and the economic and regulatory environment over the sample period that may not be adequately 
captured by our macroeconomic variables.  Second, we incorporate into our basic risk-spread 
model the unobserved effect that is unique to each individual banking organization.  This bank-
specific fixed-effect is intended to control for the banking organization’s brand value or name 
recognition among investors that are time-invariant during our sample period.   Finally, we extend 
our model to address the potential sample selection bias in the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimates.  OLS estimates could be bias if certain banks are more likely to issue sub-debt than 
are others, thus the sub-debt spreads we observe do not include the spreads (risk measures) for 
banks that decide not to issue.  For example, riskier institutions may be less willing to go to the 
market with new debt issuance out of concern that they will be more harshly disciplined by the 
bond market – i.e., they must pay a high risk premium.  Covitz, Hancock, and Kwast (2000) and 
Covitz and Harrison (2004) find evidence consistent with the view that issuance is not a random 
event, but is correlated with banks’ risk measures.  We apply Heckman’s two-stage least square 
estimation, developed by Heckman (1979) and Greene (1981), to correct for this potential bias.   
Heckman proposes that a bivariate model be used to explicitly estimate the bank’s 
decision to issue sub-debt.  Thus, we first estimate a Probit model for the issuance decision – 
whether or not to issue sub-debt.  The model of the issuance decision includes a variety of 
variables that are likely to be correlated with the banks’ issuance decision.  Based on the 
estimated Probit model, we then calculate the inverse-Mill’s ratio for each observation. The 
Inverse Mill’s ratio measures the expected value of the idiosyncratic component in the issuance 
model given D_Issuei,t. This factor is then incorporated into the risk-spread relationship to generate unbiased and consistent parameter estimates.
13
In our Probit model for the sub-debt issuance decision, we include factors that are related 
to current market conditions, regulatory capital need, and bank-specific characteristics.  The 
model is presented in equation (3) below, where the dependent variable, D_Issue, is as defined 
before: 
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The macroeconomic and risk variables have been previously defined.  Additional factors 
thought to influence the issuance decision include a binary variable PAST_Issue indicating 
whether the firm has issued any publicly traded securities in the previous six to twelve month 
period.
14   The indicator variable CAPNEED  is a measure of the bank’s need for additional 
capitalization -- a binary  variable equal to one if the capital rating in the regulators CAMEL score 
(the ‘C’ component of the CAMEL) is unsatisfactory (a rating of 3, 4, or 5) and zero otherwise.  
Banks with a 3-rated or worse ‘C’ component are likely to be pressured to raise their capital ratios 
by issuing equity or sub-debt.  The variable PE_CAPNEED is an interactive term of the price-
earnings ratio and the CAPNEED indicator variable. An undercapitalized bank's decision whether 
to issue new sub-debt or equity to meet its funding need is likely affected by the relative market 
price (over-valued or under-valued) of their shares when additional capital is needed. The price-
earnings (PE) ratio is used to proxy for the over- or under-valuation of the stock. The coefficient 
of PE_CAPNEED is therefore expected to be negative if banks tend to issue equity rather than 
                                                 
13  For observations with D_Issuei,t =1, this expected value (E[μi,t | D_Issuei,t =1]) is given by Φ(-D_Issuei,t 
_hat) / (1– Ω(-D_Issuei,t _hat) where D_Issuei,t _hat is the predicted probability that D_Issuei,t =1, and Φ(.) 
and Ω(.) are, respectively, the density function and the cumulative distribution of a standard normal random 
variable.  For observations with D_Issuei,t =0, this expected value (E[μi,t | D_Issuei,t =0]) is given by Φ(-
D_Issuei,t _hat) / (Ω(-D_Issuei,t _hat).  See Lee (1978) for more detailed discussion.   
14  We also included the ratio of insured deposits to total liabilities in the model. Previous studies found that 
riskier banks tend to rely more on insured deposits as a subsidized funding source -- see Billet, Garfinkel 
and O'Neal (1998) and Jagtiani, Kaufman and Lemieux (2002).  This variable is not included in the final 
 sub-debt when their equities are over-priced.
   
In the spirit of providing robust evidence, we estimate this first-stage Probit model in two 
ways.  First, we estimate the model using the standard Heckman model where all the 
observations in our sample are included.  The observation-specific inverse Mill’s ratio obtained 
from this procedure is denoted as λ1.  While this is the standard approach for estimating 
Heckman’s first-stage Probit model, the model was not originally designed for use with a panel 
dataset.  Our alternative method specifies a separate first-stage Probit model for each individual 
year to allow the issuance factor (the inverse Mill’s ratio) to be estimated separately through time. 
 Berger, Kyle, and Scalise (2001) employ this approach in their estimation of the inverse Mill’s 
ratio as a way to generate more accurate estimates and to take advantage of the panel structure 
of the data.  We follow that approach and denote the observation-specific inverse Mill’s ratio 
obtained in this alternative method as λ2.  The bank- and time-specific fixed effects and the 
estimated inverse Mill’s ratios are then incorporated to produce our extended models of the risk-
spread specification.    
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where Di  is the fixed-effect for bank i; and Tt  is the fixed-effect for year t.  
 
We then conduct similar analysis with this extended model as we did with the basic 
model---equation (2).  Specifically, we compare the marginal explanatory power of risk measures, 
the joint significance of risk variables, and the robustness of risk variables across different model 
specifications and across the subsamples – issuing and non-issuing observations.   
 
Single Equation Estimation for the Marginal Effect Around Issuance: 
  Our analysis so for has been perform separately for each of the subsamples.  Our prior is 
                                                                                                                                                                
 
model since insured deposit data is only reported annually and it did not add significant explanatory value.  that there will be additional disciplining around the time of new debt placements, when the market 
will be “more aware” of the bank's financial condition and the overall riskiness of the bank.  We 
have accounted for this by separately estimating equations (2) and (4) for subsets of 
observations depending on whether or not new debt issues occurred.  In this section, we combine 
the issuance and non-issuance subsamples and explicitly estimate the marginal impact 
surrounding periods when issuance occurred.  With this alternative specification, we can test 
whether the responsiveness of the risk measures is significantly different across the two groups 
of banks by interactively associating the various risk-characteristics, as reflected in equations (5). 
 The significance of the coefficients of these interactive risk measures would suggest whether the 
risk-spread relationship (or sensitivity) is significantly different across the two subsamples. 
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IV.  Data Sources and Empirical Results 
The Data   
It has been difficult to analyze and compare sub-debt spreads across banks in a time-
series analysis because of difficulties involved in finding homogeneous sub-debt issues in the 
market.  In addition to differing with respect to specific characteristics (features, options, 
maturities, etc.), a meaningful comparison of sub-debt spreads across banks may also be 
difficult because of thin trading of some issues.
15  Our sample banks and BHCs are derived from 
the largest 100 U.S. commercial banks and their parent BHCs as of year-end 1990.  For these 
banking organizations, we collected detailed information on outstanding bonds from Bloomberg 
Data Services.  We selected one representative subordinated bond for each bank and one 
                                                 
15  Bianchi, Hancock, and Kawano (2003) suggest that illiquid bonds with less frequent trading activities 
are priced relatively poorly, and that the uncertainty about an illiquid bond’s price rises under volatile 
  
                                                                                                                                                               
representative subordinated bond for each BHC at each point of time. To be included in the 
sample, the selected debt securities had to meet the following criteria: (1) be publicly traded in 
order to be able to trace historical prices and yields, (2) be in issues of at least $100 million, (3) 
be U.S. dollar denominated and issued and traded in the U.S. capital markets, (4) be rated by 
S&P and/or Moody's, and (5) be straight bonds with no callable, putable, convertible, or other 
option features.  The sample is restricted to option-free bonds to obtain a more homogeneous 
group of bonds and to avoid excessive noise introduced by the models used for computing 
option adjusted spreads, which vary substantially among market participants. The final sample 
includes subordinated bond issues for 19 banks and 39 BHCs for the period 1990-1999.     
  We collected secondary market prices of securities outstanding at quarter-end over this 
time period.
16  Bond yields were computed from the observed prices of the bonds, and 
information on the accounting risk characteristics of the issuing banks was obtained from the 
Report of Condition and Income (Call Report) for banks and Federal Reserve Y-9 and Y-9LP 
Reports for BHCs.  Information on CAPNEED was generated from confidential bank regulator’s 
CAMEL and BOPEC ratings. Bond ratings were obtained from Bloomberg or directly from S&P.  
 
Results For the Basic Risk-Spread Model 
Table 3 presents the results from estimation of our basic model of sub-debt spreads as 
presented in equation (2).  Observations for banks that recently issued new debt are analyzed 
separately and the results for this group are included in Panel A.  Results using observations 
during periods when new debt was not issued are presented in Panel B.  We include four 
alternative specifications for each subsample.  Column (1) excludes the risk measures to provide 
a basis from which we are able to calculate the marginal contribution from including measures of 
bank risk.  As stated earlier, previous studies found that prior to the early 1990s, debt spreads 
 
market conditions. 
16   Bloomberg reports BGN bond prices, which are a volume-weighted average of transaction prices in each 
day.  When securities are not traded, quoted prices (by a number of pricing providers) are reported.  
Reported quoted prices are weighted average based on at least two price sources (that are within a ‘tight’ 
range).  
were not closely related to risk characteristics. However, studies also suggest that this changed 
in the early part of our sample period following the FDICIA.  Column (2) presents results for our 
basic model incorporating balance sheet risk measures; Column (3) presents results using the 
agency risk measure; and results incorporating both sets of risk measures are included in 
Column (4).  
Generally, the results in Panel A of Table 2 suggest that macroeconomic conditions, term 
to maturity, and the bank’s risk characteristics are important determinants of sub-debt spreads.  
This holds for each of the four specifications.  Spreads are positively related to the level of short-
term risk-free interest rates (TBILL_3M) and the unemployment rate (UNEMPLOY).  Similarly, 
sub-debt spreads tend to be smaller during expansionary periods (D_EXPAND).  The spread is 
also found to be higher for securities with longer maturities (TTM_Long), but smaller for sub-debt 
that was issued at the bank level (D_BANK) compared to those issued at the BHC level.  Again, 
these results are overall consistent for each of the four specifications.     
In terms of the role of risk in determining sub-debt spreads, the results are again relatively 
consistent for observations around new debt issues across the four specifications.  Balance sheet 
measures found to significantly influence the spread include the ratio of non-performing loans 
(NPLOAN) and profitability as measured by returns on assets (ROA).  Banks with larger non-
performing loans and lower profits are subject to larger sub-debt spreads (risk premiums).  The 
coefficient of OREO becomes significant when SPRATE is also included (column 4) but with a 
negative (unexpected) sign.  The coefficients on the market leverage ratio (MKTLEV) are positive 
(as expected) but not statistically significant.  The alternative agency risk proxy (SPRATE) is 
positively related to the credit spread as expected; either when entered separately or when 
combined with the balance sheet measures.    
From Table 3 Panel B, the results found for the risk variables using the non-issuing 
observations are neither as strong nor as consistent as those found with the issuance subsample. 
 Of the included balance sheet risk measures, only OREO is significant with the expected sign, 
and the significance of that measure goes away when SPRATE is also included (column 4).   
Unlike in the issuance subsample, NPLN_NA and ROA are not significant for the non-issuance 
subsample.  MKTLEV has the expected sign, but is also not significant, as in the issuance 
subsample.  The agency risk measure (SPRATE) is significant with a similar impact to that found 
with the issuing subsample in terms of the magnitude of coefficients.  
More generally, the overall results from Table 3 indicate that the goodness-of-fit for 
observations around a new debt issue, versus observations unrelated to new issues, is much 
better with R-square values being higher with each of the four specifications.  For the most 
comprehensive specification, over 67 per cent of the variation is explained by the explanatory 
variables while only 52 percent is explained during periods when a bank did not approach the 
market to issue debt.  Also consistent with our priors, the additional explanatory power added by 
including the risk measures is greater for the observations around new debt issues. Using the 
balance sheet risk measures, the R-square increases from 55 percent to 65 percent around new 
debt issues, and only increases from 41 percent to 47 percent for non-issuing observations.  As 
expected, the differential in explanatory power across the two panels is small when using the 
credit agency risk measure, since the credit agency’s ratings are quite transparent to the public at 
all time (whether or not around new debt issuance) and they are usually quite sluggish in 
changing.  Nevertheless, the R-square from specifications that include SPRATE are also higher 
at 67 percent for the issuance subsample compared to 52 percent for the non-issuance 
subsample. 
We have demonstrated, so far, that the goodness-of-fit as measured by R-Square is 
better for the issuance compared to that of the non-issuance sub-group.  Appendix I shows that 
the R-square using the primary market spreads (spreads observed during the initial public 
offerings) is even higher – up to 72 percent  compared to 67 percent for the issuance subsample 
and 52 percent for the non-issuing subsample using spreads observed in the secondary market.  
 The explanatory power of balance sheet risk measures is also larger for primary market spreads 
– with 35 percent increase in R-Square compared to the model specification without risk 
measures.  The results suggest that the risk-spread relationship seems to be tighter in deeper  
markets with increased liquidity and transparency. 
As an alternative to the R-square and marginal R-square measures to gauge the 
goodness-of-fit across specifications and data sets, we utilize an alternative approach using the 
root mean square errors (RMSE). Using the combined data set– issuance and non-issuance 
subsamples – we estimate the risk-spread relationship and then use the estimates to calculate 
the RMSE for each subsample.  The calculated RMSEs for each model specification are reported 
in the bottom of Panels A and B of Table 3 as an alternative measure of goodness-of-fit.  As 
expected, when additional risk variables are included in the model, the goodness-of-fit improves 
and we observe a reduction in the RMSEs.  The calculated reduction in RMSE is intended to 
capture the increased explanatory power of the additional risk variables. Comparing the 
magnitude of RMSE reduction across the two subsamples – issuance vs. non-issuance – 
indicates how much the additional risk variable has helped to improve the goodness-of-fit.  From 
the RMSEs in the bottom of each column in Table 3, we find that, overall, the RMSE is smaller for 
the issuance subsample. In addition, the reduction in RMSE when the balance sheet risk factors 
are included in the model is also larger for the issuance subsample.  Our results, again, indicate a 
tighter risk-spread relationship around the issuance period – thus, stronger market discipline 
around debt issuance. 
Given the potential correlation between the risk measures, the variance of the individual 
risk measures can be quite large and we may be underestimating the true influence of risk in the 
above discussion -- see Covitz, Hancock and Kwast (2004, page 9) and Flannery and Sorescu 
(1996, page 1361).  This may explain some of the changes in the sign on coefficients in Table 2; 
e.g., the coefficient on OREO in each specification.  Thus, we also test for the overall influence of 
the risk variables by testing their joint significance in affecting spreads. Results of the F-tests 
evaluating the combined impact of the risk variables are included at the bottom of Table 3. In all 
specifications, for both panels, the null hypothesis that the joint effect of the alternative risk 
measures is equal to zero is rejected, with the calculated F-statistics being significantly greater 
for the issuance subsample.   
Finally, we evaluated the joint impact of the risk variables for each subsample by 
comparing the calculated value of the spread at the subsample mean of the explanatory variables 
to that where we increased the risk of each risk measure above the sample mean by one 
standard deviation.  Table 3 shows that, for each subsample, the spread increased as a result of 
increasing the risk measures, but the increase was significantly greater for the issuance 
observations than for the non-issuance subsample.  From Column (2) of Panel A and Panel B, 
the spreads increase by 35.4 basis points for the issuance subsample compared to 29.4 basis 
points for the non-issuance subsample.  Similarly, from Column (4) Panel A and Panel B, the 
spreads increase by 14.9 basis points and 9.0 basis points for the issuance and non-issuance 
observations, respectively, when the overall risk measures increase by one standard deviation.  
This finding is consistent with an argument that investors do seem to incorporate risk differences 
into debt pricing and appear to do so more effectively around new debt issuance period when the 
market is deeper and more transparent. 
Thus, summarizing results for our basic risk-spread model (Table 3), risk measures do 
seem to be correlated with debt spreads and to add to the explanatory power of the SPREAD 
relationship for each subsample.  The explanatory power of the relationship is stronger for banks 
that had a new debt issue within the previous six months (Panel A) and the increase in 
explanatory power from including the risk measures is greater for those banks with recent debt 
issues.  We interpret these findings to be consistent with there being a closer risk-spread 
relationship around new debt issuance and consistent with this being related to deeper markets.  
 
Results for the Extended Risk-Spread Models 
In the following analysis, we include the year fixed-effects, firm fixed-effect and account 
for potential sample selection bias.  The results of the Probit analysis of issuance decision, based 
on equation (3) and presented in Appendix II, indicate that larger banking organizations and 
those banks in need of additional capital are more likely to issue sub-debt as the coefficients of 
ASSETS and CAPNEED are significantly positive.  In addition, banks that issued publicly traded  
debt in the last 6-12 months are also more likely to issue more debt, as the coefficients of 
D_PASTISSUE are significantly positive.  The two important risk factors that impact the bank’s 
issuance decision seem to be MKTLEV and OREO – less risky banks with smaller market 
leverage ratios and smaller OREO are more likely to issue new debt.  The other risk factors, 
including the agency’s credit rating, seem to be unimportant in the banks’ issuance decision.  The 
resulting estimated inverse Mill’s ratio (λ1 and λ2) from the Probit estimates are incorporated into 
the analysis in the next step.   
Results from incorporating time and firm fixed-effects and the adjustment for the potential 
sample selection bias (the inverse Mill’s ratio) are presented in Table 4 -- the coefficients for the 
year and firm fixed-effects are not reported.  Again, the results for observations around new debt 
issues are presented in Panel A, and those for non-issuance observations are in Panel B. For the 
issuance subsample, by accounting for these additional influences, some of the economic 
variables (TBILL_3M and UNEMPLOY) have turned insignificant.  However, many of the previous 
relationships continue to hold up.  Profitability (ROA) and nonperforming loans (NPLN_NA) 
continue to be related to spreads as expected.  Similarly the agency risk measure (SPRATE) 
continues to have the expected relationship with spreads in all specifications whether entered by 
itself, or included with balance sheet risk measures.  Finally, the results do not tend to differ 
significantly when alternative measures of the Inverse Mills Ratio (λ1 and λ2) are employed and 
the sign and significance of the λ1 and λ2  are similar across the alternative specifications.  From 
Table 4 Panel B, for the non-issuance subsample, the estimated coefficients for NPLN_NA, ROA, 
and MKTLEV continue to be mostly insignificant and OREO continues to positively affect the 
spread.  The agency risk measure (SPRATE) also continues to come in significantly positive in all 
specifications.  Overall, the results are relatively robust to the extension of the model, and again, 
the risk-spread relationship continues to be different between the two-subsamples – with a 
stronger risk-spread relationship for the issuing sample.   
Perhaps more so than before, with these more complex specifications, we have significant 
potential for correlation between the risk measures, which could make the variance of the  
individual risk measures quite large.  Again, this could result in an understating of the true 
influence of risk. We, therefore, test for the joint significance of the risk variables in affecting sub-
debt spreads. In all specifications, for each Panel of results, results for the F-tests suggest that 
there is a significant joint influence from the risk variables on sub-debt spreads.   The reported F-
statistics are also consistently higher across the alternative specifications for the subsample of 
banks that recently had new debt issues (Panel A), although all exceed the critical values at 
standard levels of significance.  In addition, consistent with the earlier reported results, we find 
evidence that the explanatory power of the risk-spread relationship is significantly greater for 
banks that recently had new debt issues.  Across the alternative specifications, the R-square in 
Panel A ranges from 76-82 percent.  In no specification in Panel B does the explanatory power 
reach similar levels with R-squares ranging from 65-74 percent.   
As in Table 3, we again evaluate the economic impact of the risk variables on spreads for 
each subsample by comparing the spread at the sample mean when each risk measure is 
increased by one standard deviation.  From Columns (1) and (4) of Panel A and Panel B, the 
spreads increase by about 37 basis points for the issuance subsample compared to 8-18 basis 
points for the non-issuance subsample, when the balance sheet risk measures are increased by 
one standard deviation.  Similarly, from Columns (3) and (6) of Panel A and Panel B, the spreads 
increase by 15-19 basis points for the issuance observations compared to 5 basis points or lower 
for the non-issuance observations, when all risk measures are increased by one standard 
deviation.  Consistent with the earlier results, Table 4 also shows that the increase in spread is 
significantly greater for the issuance than for the non-issuance subsample as a result of 
increasing risk.  Again, this is consistent with an argument that investors appear to price the risk 
more effectively (stronger market discipline) around new debt issuance period. 
Overall, the results from our extended risk-spread models tend to confirm those from the 
basic model. Risk measures do seem to be correlated with sub-debt spreads and add to the 
explanatory power of the SPREAD relationship for each subsample.  The explanatory power of 
the relationship is stronger for banks that had a new debt issue (Panel A) and the increase in  
explanatory power from including the risk measures is also greater for these banks with recent 
debt issues.  We interpret these findings to be consistent with those of our basic model and 
consistent with a closer risk-spread relationship around new debt issuances.  We posit that this 
closer relationship is a result of deeper markets.  
Results for the Single Equation Estimates 
  In this section, we extend the model to include all observations (with and without new debt 
issuance) in a single relationship.  Including the issuance indicator variable and the interactive 
terms allows us to test whether the responsiveness of risk measures is significantly different, in a 
statistical sense, across the issuance and non-issuance samples.  Table 5 reports the results 
from the analysis that evaluates the marginal impact of risk factors around new debt issues, 
based on equation (5).  The significance of the economic variables in the spread model is similar 
to those reported in Table 4, where TBILL_3M and D_EXPAND are significant.  Again, the 
spreads are generally smaller for sub-debt that is issued at the bank level (rather than the BHC 
level) and larger for debt with longer time to maturity. 
  With some exceptions, the role of the risk measures is in line with expectations; and the 
exceptions are likely related to the collinearity between risk measures including the interactive 
terms.  Ignoring the marginal effect surrounding new debt issues, the coefficient on returns on 
assets (ROA), nonperforming loans (NPLN_NA), and market leverage (MKTLEV) are generally 
insignificant, while OREO is significantly positive.  The coefficients of the interactive terms 
(between the issuance indicator and the risk measures) are mostly significant.  The coefficients 
on D*ROA are consistently significant, while the coefficients of D*NPLOAN and D*OREO are 
generally significant, but the significance sometimes disappears in the specifications that also 
include credit agency rating (SPRATE and D*SPRATE).  The results overall demonstrate 
significant differences in the risk pricing (risk premiums) imposed by the market – for the issuance 
vs. non-issuance subsamples.  This supports our earlier findings that the risk-spread relationship 
is different around new-debt issuance.   
  Additionally, we test for the significance of the marginal effect of issuance and the 
combined risk measures around the time of new debt issues.  The F-statistics included at the 
bottom of Table 5 test whether the coefficients of the interactive terms are jointly zero.  F-test (1) 
tests whether the coefficients on D*NPLOAN, D*ROA, D*OREO, and D*MKTLEV are jointly zero, 
while the hypothesis for F-test (2) also include the coefficient of D*SPRATE.   The reported F-test  
statistics indicate that a hypothesis that the issuance’s marginal impact of the risk measures is 
jointly zero is rejected at standard levels of significance for three of the four specifications that 
include balance sheet risk measures.  The results indicate that the difference in the risk pricing 
behavior between the two regimes (issuance vs. non-issuance periods) is statistically significant.  
This is consistent with our earlier finding of tighter market discipline for the issuance subsample. 
  The calculated RMSE reported in the bottom of Table 5 also indicates better goodness-of-
fit for the issuance subsample and stronger risk-spread relationship for the issuance group.  
Columns (1) and (4) of Table 5 shows the reduction in RMSE from the specification that include 
only control factors (no bank-specific risk factors).  The RMSE was reduced by 1.8-3.0 for the 
issuance observations compared to only 0.8-1.4 for the non-issuance observations.  This larger 
reduction in RMSE as risk variables are added to the model specifications for the issuance 
subsample indicates better goodness-of-fit, thus stronger market discipline during the debt 
issuance period.  Similarly, the increase in spreads as risk measures are increased by one 
standard deviation is calculated for the issuance and non-issuance observations.  The difference 
between the two Risk-Spread Net Effect measures is reported in the bottom of Table 5.  The 
consistently positive differences demonstrate a larger change in SPREAD (i.e. spreads being 
more sensitive to risk) for the issuance subsample. 
  In summary, we find that accounting for additional control variables and using more 
complex specifications to describe the SPREAD model results in deterioration in the significance 
of some of the control variables. Similarly we find some inconsistencies in evaluating the impact 
of some of the risk measures across individual specifications.  However, in general, we find 
results that closely align with our priors.  In each alternative specification, a test of the joint impact 
of risk variables indicates that sub-debt spreads are related to the risk of the banks. This satisfies 
a precondition required for introducing a mandatory sub-debt program for bank regulatory capital. 
 Similarly, we find that the inclusion of risk measures adds to the explanatory power of the risk-
spread relationship and that the explanatory power is strongest for banks that recently had issued 
new debt.  Finally, estimation of our most complex specification indicates that the marginal impact  
of the risk measures is generally, with some inconsistencies, in line with there being a closer 
relationship between bank risk and sub-debt spreads around new debt issues.  Thus, the risk-
spread relationship appears to be different during the new issuance periods. This is consistent 
with our contention that market discipline in the U.S. banking industry could be enhanced if a 
mandatory sub-debt program were in place and banks were required to regularly approach the 
market. The riskier banks would not be allowed to avoid coming to the market and avoid the 
associated discipline, and high quality banks would find it in their self interest to be transparent 
and make their quality known in the new, deeper and more complete market.   
 
V.  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
  There have recently been a number of proposals to increase the role of subordinated debt 
in the bank capital requirement in an attempt to increase the role of market discipline on large 
and complex banking organizations (LCBOs).  There has also been a growing consensus that 
bank risk could be more effectively regulated if market information and market discipline were 
more fully incorporated into the bank supervisory process.  Effective market discipline will 
enhance the quality of market signals which can be used by bank supervisors for on-site as well 
as off-site monitoring efforts to identify problem institutions.  This could help regulators more 
efficiently allocate supervisory resources. 
Previous studies have found that sub-debt markets do differentiate between banks with 
different risk profiles.  However, these studies have evaluated the potential usefulness of sub-
debt in an environment that most likely is very different from the one that will characterize a fully 
implemented sub-debt program.  With a sub-debt program, the market will likely become deeper 
as issuance will be more frequent, debt will be viewed as a more viable means to raise capital, 
more attention will be paid to individual bank debt yields, bond dealers will be less reluctant to 
publicly disclose more details on debt transactions, and generally, the market will be more closely 
followed and sub-debt signals will be more informative. Fundamentally, banks will respond to the 
new regulation and optimize within the new regulatory framework with constraints that may be  
very different from those that existed before the reform. 
In order to get an indication of the potential differences between the current and potential 
sub-debt markets, we evaluate the risk-spread relationship by taking into consideration the 
enhanced market transparency surrounding new debt issues.  Our empirical results generate 
evidence consistent with the existence of market discipline in the sub-debt market, and with the 
degree of market discipline being stronger (a tighter risk-spread relationship) during the period 
around new debt issuance.  We attribute this to greater liquidity and transparency.  Our overall 
results support the argument that the degree of market discipline in the U.S. banking industry 
would likely be enhanced by requiring banks to maintain part of their regulatory capital 
requirement in the form sub-debt, and to require banks to ‘come-to-the-market’ at regular 
intervals with new debt issues regardless of their current financial condition. 
A common argument given for not going forward with such a program is that the 
characteristics of the market are such that the signal may be too noisy to use for public policy.  
That is, sub-debt markets are too thin, and instrument characteristics are too heterogeneous. 
However, as explained earlier, once a program is initiated, the markets will become deeper and, if 
properly implemented, the instruments will become much more homogeneous.  What we have 
tried to show in the current analysis is that even in today’s environment, the sub-debt market 
seems to operate more effectively during periods that more closely resemble the state of the 
world that would exist with a fully implemented sub-debt program.  With a fully implemented 
program, sub-debt markets would likely become even deeper and more fluid than that seen 
around new issues in today’s markets, making our estimates of increased market discipline a 
lower bound of the potential for such a program.      
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Bond yield minus maturity matched U.S. Treasury yield (basis point). 
 
Log of total assets. 
 
Binary variable – equals 1 for bank-issued bonds, zero otherwise (for 
BHC-issued bonds). 
 
Indicator for time to maturity of at least 5 years, zero otherwise. 
 
Binary variable -- equals 1 if the banking firm issued publicly traded 
securities in the current quarter or the previous quarter, zero otherwise. 
 
Binary variable – equals 1 if the banking firm issued debt in the 6-12 
month period prior to the current quarter, zero otherwise. 
 
Binary variable for capital need =1 if ‘C’ rating (in the CAMEL rating) is 
3, 4, or 5; zero otherwise.  The CAMEL ratings are assigned by bank 
regulators, where C=Capital, A=Asset quality, M=Management, 
E=Earnings, L=Liquidity. 
 
Interactive term of the bank’s price earnings ratio and the binary 
variable CAPNEED. 
 
Cardinalized S&P credit rating where less creditworthy banks (lower 
alphabetical rating) are converted to a larger numerical rating (see 
Jagtiani, Kaufman, Lemieux 2002). 
 
Ratio of total liabilities (book) divided by market value of common 
stocks plus book value of preferred stocks. 
 
The ratio of nonaccruing non-performing loans to total assets (%). 
 
Other real estate owned to total assets (%). 
  
The ratio of net income to total assets (%). 
 
3-mo Treasury yield (%). 
 
National unemployment rate (%). 
 
Binary variable equal to one for the period of economic expansion 
(defined by the NBER), zero otherwise. 
  
Table 2 
Data Summary Statistics and  
Cardinalization of the S&P Rating 
 
 
 Panel A:  Summary Statistics 
Issuance Subsample  Non-Issuance Subsample    




Total Assets ($Millions) 
 








NPLOAN (% of Assets) 
 
OREO (% of Assets) 
 
























































































 Panel B:  The Cardinalization of S&P Credit Rating 



























































 Based on Jagtiani, Kaufman, and Lemieux (2002) and Ronn and Verma (1987) 
 Table 3:  Basic Risk-spread Analysis 
-OLS Regression Results- 
 
The estimation is based on equation (2), where the dependent variable is sub-debt spread (SPREAD).  The analysis is 
based on the 1990-1999 period, and it is performed separately for the two subsamples – Panel A includes 302 issuance 
observations where D_Issue=1;  Panel B includes 304 non-issuance observations where D_Issue=0.  Description of the 
independent variables are summarized in Table 1.  t-statistics are in parentheses.   The ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The marginal R
2 is calculated relative to the basic model 
specification that includes only economic and control factors.  F-test (1) is for the hypothesis that coefficients of all the 
balance-sheet risk characteristics are jointly zero.  F-test (2) is for the hypothesis that coefficients of all the risk 
characteristics (including the S&P rating) are jointly zero. 
 
 
Panel A: Risk-spread Relationship for the Issuance Subsample  (N=302) 
 









































































































































































2   -- From (1) 
Marginal R
2   -- From (3) 
 
RMSE 
Reduction in RMSE – From (1) 
 
F-test (1) – B/S Risks 
F_test (2) – All Risks 
 



















































14.9 bp Table 3:  Basic Risk-spread Analysis (Continued) 
-OLS Regression Results- 
 
 
The estimation is based on equation (2), where the dependent variable is sub-debt spread (SPREAD).  The analysis is 
based on the 1990-1999 period, and it is performed separately for the two subsamples – Panel A includes 302 issuance 
observations where D_Issue=1;  Panel B includes 304 non-issuance observations where D_Issue=0.  Description of the 
independent variables are summarized in Table 1.  t-statistics are in parentheses.   The ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The marginal R
2 is calculated relative to the basic model 
specification that includes only economic and control factors.  F-test is for the hypothesis that all the risk characteristics 
are jointly not significantly different from zero. 
 
 
Panel B:  Risk-spread Relationship for the Non-Issuance Subsample (N=304) 
 









































































































































































2   -- From (1) 
Marginal R
2   -- From (3) 
 
RMSE 
Reduction in RMSE – From (1) 
 
F-test (1) – B/S Risk Measures 
F_test (2) – All Risk Measures 
 

















































9.0 bp Table 4:  Extended Risk-Spread Model 
With Sample Selection Bias Correction, Year Fixed-Effects, and Firm Fixed-Effects 
 
The estimation is based on equation (4), where the dependent variable is sub-debt spread (SPREAD).  The analysis is performed 
separately for the two subsamples – Panel A includes 302 issuance obs. where D_Issue=1; Panel B includes 304 non-issuance obs. 
where D_Issue=0.  The inverse Mill’s ratio (λ1) is estimated using the standard Heckman correction procedure using the entire sample. 
 The alternative inverse Mill’s ratio (λ2) is estimated separately in each year, allowing for variation in the probability of debt issuance 
through time.  Results in Columns 4, 5, and 6 (using λ2) are based on the period 1991-1998 only, since there are not enough number 
of spread observations in 1990 and 1999 to estimate Lambda2 separately in each year. t-statistics are in parentheses.  The marginal 
R
2 is calculated relative to the basic model specification that includes only economic and control factors.  F-test (1) is for the 
hypothesis that coefficients of all the balance-sheet risks are jointly zero.  F-test (2) is for the hypothesis that coefficients of all the risk 
characteristics (including S&P rating) are jointly zero.  The t-statistics are in parentheses.   The ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A:  Issuance Subsample 
 
















































































































































































































































































2   
Marginal R
2   -- From 
previous column 
 
F-test (1) – B/S Risks 
F_test (2) – All Risks 




































































283 Table 4:  Extended Risk-Spread Model 
With Sample Selection Bias Correction, Year Fixed-Effects, and Firm Fixed-Effects 
 
The estimation is based on equation (4), where the dependent variable is sub-debt spread (SPREAD).  The analysis is performed 
separately for the two subsamples – Panel A includes 302 issuance obs. where D_Issue=1; Panel B includes 304 non-issuance obs. 
where D_Issue=0.  The inverse Mill’s ratio (λ1) is estimated using the standard Heckman correction procedure using the entire sample. 
 The alternative inverse Mill’s ratio (λ2) is estimated separately in each year, allowing for variation in the probability of debt issuance 
through time.  Results in Columns 4, 5, and 6 (using λ2) are based on the period 1991-1998 only, since there are not enough number 
of spread observations in 1990 and 1999 to estimate Lambda2 separately in each year. t-statistics are in parentheses.  The marginal 
R
2 is calculated relative to the basic model specification that includes only economic and control factors.  F-test (1) is for the 
hypothesis that coefficients of all the balance-sheet risks are jointly zero.  F-test (2) is for the hypothesis that coefficients of all the risk 
characteristics (including S&P rating) are jointly zero.  The t-statistics are in parentheses.   The ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel B:  Risk-spread Relationship for the Non-Issuance Subsample (N=304) 
 
















































































































































































































































































2   
Marginal R
2   -- From (3) 
 
F-test (1) – B/S Risks 
F_test (2) – All Risks 
 




































































267 Table 5:  Extended Risk-spread Model 
Using Entire Sample and Interactive Issuance Indicator & Risk Measures 
 
The estimation is based on equation (5).  The Marginal R
2 Is calculated based on the specification that includes only economic and 
control factors.  The F-test is for the hypothesis that all the interactive issuance & balance sheet risk variables (the marginal impacts 
of risk) are jointly zero.  The risk variables in F-test (1) include only balance-sheet risk (excluding SPRATE) while F-test (2) include 
all risk factors. t-statistics are in parentheses.   The ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively.  Number of observations used are 606 for columns (1) to (3) and 550 for columns (4) to (6).  RMSE for a specification 
that include only control factors are 32.2 (when using λ1) and 40.6 (when using λ2). 
 
































D * NPLOAN 
 
 
D * ROA 
 
 
D * OREO 
 
 
































































































































-10.40**  -19.10***  -14.80*** 
(-2.24)  (-3.35)  (-2.71) 




-16.20**  -30.40*** 
(-2.09)  (-2.67) 
     











(-2.43)  (-2.33) 
























0.92  -6.89 
(0.10)  (-0.60) 
   
16.70**  12.40 
(2.29)  (1.58) 
   









(4.22)  (3.56) 
   
--  -1.35 
  (-0.19) 
   
--  -1.08 
  (-0.22) 
   









  (1.74) 
   
--  -0.05 
  (-0.59) 
   
   
--  8.35  6.19 
  (1.45)  (1.12) 












--  -12.10* 
  (-1.81) 
     




  (-1.28) 
   
--  0.13 
(0.89) 
0.07 
  (0.54) 
       
49.50***  47.40***  --  38.20*** 
(4.83)  (7.25)    (3.91) 
       
4.08  0.13  --  1.97 
(1.55)  (0.15)    (0.82) 
       
-5.15  --  --  -- 
(-0.83)       
       
--  -5.16**  -4.73***  -4.59* 
(-2.09)  (-2.57)  (-1.81) 
R
2 (Adjusted)  73.2%  75.3%  75.5%  67.4%  69.7%  69.8% 
RMSE -- Issuance   30.4  29.6  29.2  24.3  23.6  23.2 
RMSE Reduction – Issuance  1.8  2.7  3.0  3.0  3.7  4.1 
RMSE – Non-Issuance  39.8  38.3  37.9  32.8  31.8  31.6 
RMSE Reduction – Non-Issuance  0.8  2.3  2.7  1.4  2.3  2.5 
F-test (1)  3.28**  --  3.02**  2.44**  --  1.68 
F_test (2)   --  --  2.45**  --  --  1.40 
Difference Risk-Spread Net Effect  11.50 bp  --  5.97 bp  10.10 bp  --  6.88 bp 
  
 
Appendix I:  Primary Market 
 
Basic Risk-spread Analysis 
Using Standard OLS Regression 
 
 
The estimation is based on equation (2), where the dependent variable is sub-debt spread (SPREAD).  The analysis 
is based on the 1990-1999 period.   Description of the independent variables are summarized in Table 1.  The t-
statistics are in parentheses.   The ***, **, and * denote statistically significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. The marginal R
2 is calculated relative to the basic model specification that includes only economic and 
control factors.  F-test is for the hypothesis that all the risk characteristics are jointly not significantly different from 
zero.  Note that the binary variable indicating that the bond’s time to maturity being 5 years or longer (TTM_LONG) is 
not included here because it has the same value (equals 1) for all the primary market observations. 
 
Risk-spread Relationship for the Primary Market Sample  (N=68) 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) 
         
20.60***  22.90***  20.40***  28.60***  TBILL_3M 
(5.26)  (6.41)  (4.30)  (4.41)   
         
UNEMPLOY  15.70**  26.90***  9.85  35.70*** 
   (2.27)  4.68)  (1.51)  (3.73) 
         
D_EXPAND  -21.40  -23.40  -15.4  -3.19 
  (-1.28)  (-1.10)  (-0.94)  (-0.12) 
         
D_BANK  3.36  10.60  -2.26  0.69 
  (0.44)  (1.33)  (-0.34)  (0.06) 
         
ASSETS  -11.8**  9.50  -20.80***  2.03 
  (-2.30)  (1.60)  (-4.88)  (0.30) 
         
NPLOAN  --  21.80***  16.50**  -- 
    (2.88)  (2.20)   
         
ROA  --  -23.80***  -21.00**  -- 
    (-2.95)  (-2.37)   
         
OREO  --  11.50  -4.14  -- 
    (0.68)  (-0.24)   
         
MKTLEV  --  1.27**  1.22**  -- 
    (2.58)  (2.54)   
         
SPRATE  42.90***  --  21.30**  -- 
  (6.56)    (2.27)   




2  72.2%  63.9%  69.7%  35.4%  (Adjusted) 
Marginal  R
2    36.8%  28.5%  34.3%  --  -- From (1) 
Marginal R
2    8.3%  --  --  --  -- From (3) 
         
16.40***  --  17.50***  --  F-test (1) – B/S Risks 
3.70***  --  --  --  F_test (2) – All Risks 
         
48.9 bp  --  61.9 bp  --  Risk-Spread Net Effect  
  
 
Appendix II:  Probit Analysis for Issuing Decision 
Using Entire Sample – 606 Observations 
 
 
The estimation is based on equation (3), where the dependent variable is the binary variable that indicates 
whether the bank has new debt issue in the current or previous quarter (D_Issue).  The analysis is based 
on the 1990-1999 period. Description of the independent variables are summarized in Table 1.  The ***, **, 
and * denote statistically significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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1.49  0.1221  TBILL_3M 
     
UNEMPLOY  3.65  0.3506*** 
      
D_EXPAND  0.08  0.0251 
     
ASSETS  4.16  0.3643*** 
     
MKTLEV  -2.90  -0.0094*** 
     
NPLOAN  0.21  0.0249 
     
OREO  -2.28  -0.6729** 
     
ROA  0.56  0.0804 
     
CAPNEED  2.48  1.1882** 
     
PE_CAPNEED  -0.74  -0.3206 
     
PAST_ Issue  5.51  0.6223*** 
     
SPRATE  -0.58  -0.0902 
 
     
Log Likelihood  -365.64 
   
2 Pseudo-R 17.5% 
  2